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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Brazil‟s growing status as a potential world power cannot 
obscure the characteristics of its other reality:  that of a 
country with vast inequalities and high crime rates.  The 
Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime 
syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm 
that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a 
product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also 
of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio‟s favela 
slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the 
State‟s control of parts of Rio territory.     
 
As Brazil‟s soft power projection grows, it is seriously 
challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime.  
Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply 
embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil‟s success 
may yet further retrench the CV‟s activities. Culpability for 
organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but 
must also be shared among the willing consumers, among 
whom can be found educated and elite members of society, 
as well as the impoverished and desperate. 
 
The Brazilian government needs a top-down response 
addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, 
Brazil‟s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a 
bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled 
elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil 
must target reform across public health, housing, education 
and above all, law enforcement.  Without such changes, 
Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio‟s wealthy will 
still be able to revel in the city‟s beauty, albeit from behind 
armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city‟s poor 
will yield—either as victims or perpetrators—to the 
desperate measures of organized crime. 
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BRAZIL:  INEQUALITY AND CRIME 
 
Beaches, beautiful bikini-clad girls and blue-water bays: 
Brazil conjures an alluring cliché. But the brutal reality of 
slums and AK-47-toting teenagers, clearly visible amidst the 
luscious scenery, rarely intrudes upon the images that fuel so 
many tourist daydreams. 
 
Chaos and crime alongside beauty and wealth may not be the 
stuff of tourists‟ fantasies but it is the waking nightmare Rio 
de Janeiro residents have lived with since the 1980s.A walk 
through the metropolis yields the sight of myriad wall murals 
and graffiti bearing the initials CV—the calling card of the 
Comando Vermelho (Red Command), Rio‟s largest and most 
powerful organized crime faction. The gang‟s rapid rise to 
power through the city‟s prisons and favela slums can be 
plotted against the state‟s emergence from parlous “third-
world” status to its current bid for great power recognition. 
In both stories, a dualistic, omnipresent tension between 
success and failure features prominently. 
 
In Rio, that dualism‟s presence exists at eye-level:  conclaves 
of million-dollar abodes and notable billionaires—Eike 
Batista, the eighth richest man in the world, is just one of the 
30 Forbes-ranked examples
1—stand in remarkably sharp 
contrast to the quilt of over 1000 favelas laid like a blanket 
over the city‟s uniquely mountainous and forested 
topography. The physical distance between rich and poor can 
often be measured in meters, while the distance in dollars 
looks like one of the planet‟s greatest chasms.  Indeed, Brazil 
consistently registers among the world‟s highest GINI index 
                                                             
1
 “The World‟s Billionaires,” Forbes.com, (9 March 
2011),http://www.forbes.com/wealth/billionaires/list (accessed 1 April, 
2011). 
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of income equality coefficients
2
. While the number has 
improved in the last few years thanks to Brazil‟s economic 
growth (down to 54.0 in 2010 from 55.0 in 2009
3
) it is still 
comparable to such locales as Haiti at 59.5 and South Africa 
at 57.8
4—and this prosperity gap serves as one of the 
principal drivers of the urban warfare that organized crime 
has unleashed. 
 
The iniquities of Brazil‟s megacities, however, have not been 
barriers in the country‟s projection of its newfound soft 
power. The proof lies in Rio being accorded the privilege of 
hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer 
Olympics. As the city and the State comes to grips with 
controlling the CV and violent conflict in Rio‟s streets in 
preparation for the games‟ looming deadlines, the intricacies 
of the task raise a serious question: Does economic 
improvement naturally herald the inevitable demise of the 
CV, or do systemic internalities pose bigger obstacles in 
controlling organized crime than fiscal ascendance can 
surmount? 
 
 
                                                             
2
 Gini-coefficient of inequality: This is the most commonly used measure 
of inequality. The coefficient varies between 0, which reflects complete 
equality and 1, which indicates complete inequality (one person has all 
the income or consumption, all others have none). 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVER
TY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20238991~menuPK:492138~pagePK:14895
6~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html.  
3
 World Bank. “Brazil Country Brief,” World Bank Online, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEX
T/BRAZILEXTN/0,,menuPK:322351~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~th
eSitePK:322341,00.html (accessed 1 April, 2011). 
4
 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 
2009. United Nations Development Program, 
2009,http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/161.html (accessed 1 March, 
2011). 
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DRUGS AND ARMS TRAFFICKING  
 
Multiple domestic factors coalesced within Brazil to plough 
a furrow in which home-grown gangs like the CV could 
germinate and flourish. But external factors provided the 
crucial profit incentive. During the late 1970s, the formation 
of Colombia‟s Medellin and Cali cocaine cartels generated a 
logistical need to traffic goods to consumers in the United 
States (US) and Europe. Rio, with its ports and airports, was 
an obvious target for Colombia‟s drug lords. Producers in 
Brazil‟s bordering countries of Peru and land-locked Bolivia 
also saw a natural partner in their eastern neighbor. As 
cocaine prices and demand grew in the 1980s, so did the 
importance of Rio as a pivotal distribution point for coca-
growing nations. Consequently, the city saw an 
unprecedented increase in violence. 
 
According to a UNESCO report, homicides in Rio rose 
sharply in 1980—even as the city experienced a decrease in 
population growth of 2 percent. Violent deaths accounted for 
50 percent of youth mortality in Rio and by 2003, that 
percentage reached 75 percent.
5
  Official crime statistics for 
metropolitan Rio indicate the 1982 homicide rate by 
handguns stood at 20.5/100,000, tripling to its all-time peak 
of 61.2/100,000 by 1989. Since then, the rate has stabilized 
at around 50/100,000.
6
 
 
To arm themselves, drug gangs like the CV looked to 
neighboring countries for weapons. The criminal paradise of 
the so-called Tri-Border Area (TBA), the heavily forested 
and poorly patrolled nexus where Brazil meets Paraguay and 
                                                             
5
 UNESCO. Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: The Case of 
Rio, (Rio de Janeiro: UNESCO, 2007), 2-4, 
http://www.ims.uerj.br/nupevi/thecaseofrio.pdf (accessed 1 March, 
2011). 
6
 http://www.ims.uerj.br/nupevi/thecaseofrio.pdf.  
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Argentina, has served as a critical transit point. Gangsters 
typically retrieve weapons and drugs along Paraguay‟s 
porous 800-kilometer undefined border with Brazil.
7
 The 
Weapons Trafficking Map produced by Viva Rio, a Brazilian 
non-government organization formed to address many of 
Rio‟s urban problems, estimates that 7.6 million illegal 
weapons (handguns and machine guns) remain in circulation, 
16.4 percent of which are in use in Rio.
8
 
 
Eradication efforts in the last decade reduced Colombia‟s 
role as a cocaine producer by as much as 57 percent,
9
though 
drug cartels from Mexico, as well as Peruvian and Bolivian 
production, have partially filled that vacuum.
10
While this net 
drop in cocaine-based trafficking dovetails with decreased 
cocaine use internationally, organized crime factions in Rio 
have safeguarded their position by diversifying into new 
products and pushing their wares domestically: 
 
Criminal organizations that have traditionally 
been involved in drug trafficking at the 
international level have also started to 
engage in drug trafficking and other forms of 
drug-related crime at the national level. The 
availability of a greater variety of illicit drugs 
and the increase in the abuse of those drugs, 
                                                             
7
 Rex Hudson. “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border 
Area (TBA) of South America.” Library of Congress Federal Research 
Division, July 2003, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-
files/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf (accessed 1 March 2011). 
8
 “Maior parte de armas e drogas entram no Pais por 18 pontos,” O 
Jornal Online, 19 January, 2011 
http://www.ojornalweb.com/2011/01/09/maior-parte-de-armas-e-drogas-
entram-no-pais-por-18-pontos/ (accessed 1 March, 2011). 
9
 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Colombia, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm (accessed 1 March, 2011). 
10
 International Narcotics Control Board. Annual Report 2010. Vienna: 
International Narcotics Control Board, 2010: p.72. 
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in particular among youth, indicate that the 
illicit drug market continues to change.
11
 
 
Thus, even a significant decrease in external activity has not 
been sufficient enough to have an analogous impact on the 
city‟s gangs. This conclusion prompts a closer look at the CV 
itself. 
 
 
THE REVOLUTIONARY ROOTS OF THE COMANDO 
VERMELHO (CV) 
 
Investigative journalist, Carlos Amorim, a Rio native and the 
most prolific expert on the CV, asserts the gang‟s origins as 
the product of Brazil‟s military dictatorship. Amorim has 
written a trilogy on organized crime in Brazil, the first being 
Comando Vermelho: A Historia Secreta do Crime 
Organizado (Comando Vermelho: The Secret History of 
Organized Crime).  Amorim argues that the CV is the result 
of Brazil‟s dictatorship in the late 1970s. The vacuum 
created by the State‟s neglect of proper governance, 
combined with an oligarchic strain of corrupt capitalism, 
relegated the masses, especially the poor of the favelas, to 
the periphery. As a result, founding members of the CV 
wound up appropriating the methods of educated leftist 
armed rebels—from revolutionary jargon to urban guerrilla 
tactics to rigid line of command—to great success. In doing 
so, the group amassed such significant power that they 
effectively posed (and still do) a direct challenge to the 
State.
12
 
 
From 1964 to 1985, Brazilians lived under what‟s known in 
Portuguese as the “years of lead.” When the Army marched 
                                                             
11
 International Narcotics Control Board. Annual Report 2010. p.72. 
12
 Carlos Amorim, Comando Vermelho: A Historia Secreta do Crime 
Organizado. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1993.  
7 
 
into Rio in 1964 to depose the left-wing president, João 
Goulart, they instituted a 21-year crackdown on free speech, 
freedom of the press, social movements and any forms of 
protest, often torturing anyone who dissented (including 
current Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff).During this 
period, in the Cândido Mendes Prison on Ilha Grande (“Big 
Island”), situated in one of Rio‟s many bays, petty thieves 
and bank robbers were being put in the same filthy, humid, 
overcrowded cells as the university-educated anti-
government protesters (several of whom were from middle 
and upper class families)sent to prison under the 
dictatorship‟s notorious National Security Law of 1967 (Lei 
de Segurança Nacional or LSN). The politicized elites 
coached the common criminals—most of whom were poor 
and simply resorting to crime for survival—in the language, 
logistics and command structure of revolution. 
 
The disadvantaged were taught wide range of practical 
terrorist skills, from bomb-making to tunnel-building. These 
prisoners, organized among six main phalanxes that 
represented sections of the institution, focused their newly-
trained energies variously on denouncing the state jail 
apparatus and their poor living conditions. By 1979, a war 
for hegemony broke out among the phalanxes. The most 
brutal and powerful group, comprised of members from 
northern Rio‟s favelas, first established its leadership over 
the jail, and then set its sights beyond prison.  Thus the CV 
was born.  
 
As key members of this group escaped from their island 
penitentiary back to Rio‟s streets (while those still within 
used visiting peers and family members to convey orders to 
their cohorts on the outside), their focus turned to the 
exploding trade of cocaine. The money from assisting 
external organized crime syndicates could be used to survive 
and finance freeing their still-imprisoned associates. The CV 
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also justified using the money as financing for “a permanent 
fight against repression and abuses.” Indeed, the gang‟s 
slogan became (and still is) “Peace, Justice and Liberty.”13 
 
Tamara Makarenko, whose Crime-Terror Continuum tracks 
the ideological agenda of terrorist groups against the profit-
seeking one of organized crime, echoes some of the narrative 
points that Amorim illuminates in his history of the 
CV.
14
However, the CV(and other Brazilian gangs like São 
Paulo‟s PCC [Primeiro Comando do Capital]), defies the 
typical path Makarenko cites; in most cases, movement 
along a Crime-Terror continuum sees terrorist groups 
shifting towards the use of crime, rather than the other way 
around. In cases where criminal groups use political tactics 
to achieve their aims, she writes:  
 
It is important to clarify that their intention 
was not to change the status quo, but merely 
to secure their operational environment. As 
Dishman notes, criminal organisations use 
„selective and calibrated violence to destroy 
competitors or threaten counternarcotic 
authorities. As such, a violent attack directed 
by a TCO [transnational criminal 
organisation] is intended for a specific „anti-
constituency‟ rather than a national or 
international audience, and it is not laced 
with political rhetoric‟ [17].”15 
 
Others, however, counter Makarenko‟s notion by pointing to 
the CV‟s routine adherence to political rhetoric regardless of 
                                                             
13
 Amorim, 23. 
14
 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the 
Interplay Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 
Global Crime Vol. 6, No.1 (February 2004), 129-145. 
15
 Makarenko, 133. 
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the effect on its own illicit activities. Anthropologist James 
Holston suggests that the CV employs a perverse and 
uniquely Brazilian use of the political language of 
democracy—one which has become an evaluative standard 
to explain their murderous violence. Considering the 
revolutionary prison origins of the CV and the equally 
abusive, corrupt and violent tactics of the Brazilian state and 
its security apparatus, this explanation appears to offer a 
more illuminating view than Makarenko‟s in explaining 
Rio‟s situation. Holston asserts: 
 
Brazil‟s democracy has thus far produced a 
dangerous, hybrid space of citizenship as a 
sphere of social change in which the legal 
and the illegal, legitimate and criminal, just 
and unjust, and civil and uncivil claim the 
same moral ground of citizen rights and 
respect by way of contradictory social 
practices, a hybrid space in which the 
rationalities of crime, revolution, democratic 
citizenship, and law combine.
16
 
 
Holston cites a proclamation that the CV issued to the city of 
Rio in 2003 imposing a shut-down of commerce in the name 
of justice
17—a peculiar demand for an organized crime 
faction. The CV justifies its practice of crime and terror with 
the rationale of citizenship, frequently using public talk of 
rights and staging violent protests when prison rebellions 
break out. According to Holston, this is due to the 
differentiated, unofficially dual tracked citizenship that has 
                                                             
16
 James Holston, “Dangerous Spaces of Citizenship: Gang Talk, Rights 
Talk and Rule of Law in Brazil,” (Panel paper, University of California, 
Berkeley, 2008) 6, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~piirs/projects/Democracy&Development/pap
ers/Panel%20IV_Holston_.pdf (accessed 1 March, 2011). 
17
 Holston, 5. 
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arisen in Brazil as a legacy of its colonial, oligarchic and 
dictatorship-flecked history. The poor citizens are neglected 
by the State through the denial of basic services and legal 
justice. The State sees human rights for criminals, who 
almost always come from the poor classes, as “privileges for 
bandits.” Elites (especially at the levels of government and 
law enforcement), on the other hand, talk of protection of the 
rights of the poor while they negate these same rights 
through corruption, violent interdiction and ignoring 
conditions in places like favelas and prisons, leaving poor 
citizens to essentially fend for themselves. This contradictory 
attitude towards citizens‟ rights (highlighted by the visible 
income inequality that defines the country) serves as a key 
factor in the CV‟s continued use of rhetoric—and an obstacle 
in the government‟s attempt to effectively eradicate the CV 
and organized crime activities due to the mistrust of the state 
it fosters. 
 
THE CURRENT COMANDO VERMELHO 
 
Like the Mafia, the CV entrench themselves within their 
communities by combining terror and public works. The 
gang‟s rule is absolute within the favelas they “own.”Any 
infraction will be met with death. However, the cartel also 
provides favela residents with such basic necessities as 
cooking fuel, electricity, informal transport and medicine—
albeit at rent-seeking prices higher than market rates. 
Consequently, gangs and residents share a complex 
interdependency. Within its territories, the CV is the State. 
 
Unlike the Mafia, however, the CV lacks a hierarchical 
structure—a function of its decentralized territorial control 
over the vast, interconnected hillside networks of favelas. 
The CV‟s drug trafficking operations consist of a horizontal 
arrangement by which allied favelas provide guns or drugs as 
needed, notes Alba Zaluar, director of the NUPEV Violence 
11 
 
Research Center at the University of Rio de Janeiro and an 
author of a 2007 UNESCO report on Rio. Horizontal 
reciprocity defines the interactions among allied crews as 
they join the geographically defined regions together into 
larger networks.
18
 This poses the greatest logistical difficulty 
for law enforcement in curbing the gang‟s operations, since 
this requires house-to-house counter-insurgency operations 
over mountainous terrain. 
 
The growing cultural economy around the CV further 
exacerbates eradication difficulties. Within Rio, the gang is a 
verifiable brand, its red and white logo as identifiable as a 
soccer team‟s colors. But its commercial identity expands 
well beyond Brazil‟s borders: fans of worldwide videogame 
phenomenon Grand Theft Auto can play as CV members and 
watch realistic fight modules over YouTube; and last year, a 
docu-drama of the gang‟s history, 400 Contra Um (“Four 
Hundred Against One”), was released to critical and popular 
acclaim. But the CV‟s foray into the entertainment business 
may be most pernicious: the CV releases recordings of 
popular Rio “funk” musicians, the tunes played at CV bailes 
funk (“funk balls”) all over the city. The parties not only 
generate income from punters clamoring to get in, they also 
serve as clandestine gang recruiting environments and places 
of exchange for drugs and guns. 
 
As Amorim points out, the gang has morphed with the times: 
  
The trafficking of drugs—and the CV itself—
is no longer confined to the favelas. It has 
now reached the middle classes outside of the 
slums, with ample support from mobile 
telephony and the Internet. The drug business 
now includes trafficking of synthetic drugs, 
                                                             
18
UNESCO, Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: The Case of 
Rio, Rio de Janeiro: UNESCO, 2007, 13-14. 
12 
 
amply distributed through schools and places 
where young people hang out. In addition, 
there is information that the three principal 
organized crime gangs of Rio (CV, Terceiro 
Comando Puro [TCP] and Amigos dos 
Amigos [ADA]) have unified in a commercial 
pact to dominate more than 70% of the total 
drug distribution.”19 
 
Indeed, the drug business of the CV has recently expanded to 
include the sale of a powerful and deadly new product 
known in Portuguese as “oxi.” The CV, in an agreement with 
the PCC, took over control of crack distribution since the 
drug‟s first appearance in Brazil in 1989.In the last five 
years, in search of new drugs similar to crack that could be 
cheaply synthesized from the leftovers of Bolivian and 
Peruvian cocaine production, the CV has been connected 
with the appearance of the crack-like oxi (short for 
“oxidado,” meaning rusted or oxidized), which consists of 
the base coca paste used for cocaine production, mixed with 
kerosene or gasoline, acetone and battery fluid. An 
extremely addictive substance, oxi is considered four times 
more lethal than crack, with users typically dying within a 
year due to the drug‟s toxicity.20 The drug‟s distribution has 
spread alarmingly quickly within the last six years, at first 
among the poor and jobless of Brazil‟s Northeastern and 
Amazonian regions and within the last year, to Brazil‟s 
mega-cities. In May 2011, police officers made the first oxi 
bust in Rio de Janeiro state, in the middle-class suburb of 
Niterói (25 minutes from downtown Rio).  CV-connected 
traffickers were found within a local fishing community with 
                                                             
19
Amorim, Carlos, e-mail Interview by Regina Joseph, 13 April 2011, 
New York, NY.  
20
 Patricia Maresch, “Oxi: New Drug Terrifies Brazil,” Rio Times Online, 
26 April, 2011, http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/front-page/oxi-
new-drug-terrifies-brazil/ (accessed 26 April, 2011). 
13 
 
caches of oxi, cocaine, crack, cannabis and automatic 
weapons.
21Driving the drug‟s fast rise are oxi‟s addictive 
properties and its price—BR$2 for a rock of oxi, versus 
BR$8 for a rock of crack.
22
 
 
Despite such diversification however, the CV no longer 
dominates as much territory as it once did. Key CV leaders 
are either dead or in prison and most members now are 
thuggish teenagers, unlike the more mature members of 
earlier years. More significantly, favela-dwelling inactive 
and active members of law enforcement and fire departments 
formed heavily-armed vigilante militias determined to drive 
out gangs from their communities. The militia‟s firepower 
outmatched that of the gangs. After more than five years of 
brutal counter-insurgencies—as state authorities looked 
away—these paramilitary brigades achieved a measure of 
success (and profit, as militias took over the rent-seeking 
racketeering of the gang cells they vanquished). According 
to a 2009 study by the University of Rio de Janeiro‟s 
Violence Research center (Nupev-Uerj), militias went from 
controlling 10 percent of the city‟s most violent favelas in 
2005 to 36 percent by 2008. By 2009, 41.5 percent of the 
1000 favelas in Rio were controlled by militias, versus 40 
percent controlled by the CV.
23
 
 
                                                             
21
Gustavo Carvalho and Gabriel Saboia, “Polícia apreende 'oxi' em 
Niterói,” Jornal O São Gonçalo Online, 17 May, 2011 
http://www.osaogoncalo.com.br/site/pol%C3%ADcia/2011/5/19/26327/p
ol%C3%ADcia+apreende+oxi+em+niter%C3%B3i (accessed 17 May, 
2011). 
22
http://www.osaogoncalo.com.br/site/pol%C3%ADcia/2011/5/19/26327
/pol%C3%ADcia+apreende+oxi+em+niter%C3%B3i. 
23
 Luiz AgostoGollo, “Vigilante Groups Trump Drug Gangs and Become 
Rio‟s New Authority.” Brazil Online, 11 November 2009, 
http://www.brazzil.com/home-mainmenu-1/200-january-2009/10295-
vigilante-groups-in-brazil-trump-drug-gangs-and-become-rios-new-
authority.html (accessed 1 March, 2011). 
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THE LIMITS OF CONTROL:  CAN STATE ECONOMIC 
SUCCESS OVERCOME ORGANIZED CRIME? 
 
State authorities like Rio de Janeiro‟s governor Sergio 
Cabral, eager to position decreases in the CV‟s authority and 
activity as a function of improved, enlightened enforcement 
tactics, point to new approaches like that of the UPPs (the 
Pacification Police Units)—a semi-permanent favela force 
whose role is to integrate into the communities and engender 
trust in the police by working and living alongside the poor. 
Kevlar body-armor-wearing officers snuggle up to babies in 
makeshift daycare centers; teach unemployed youth 
everything from guitar to jiu jitsu; and attempt to create an 
alternative to the perception of police forces as corrupt, 
abusive and purveyors of as much terror to favela residents 
as organized crime gangs.
24
 
 
Politicians crow over such statistics as the declining 
homicide rate in Rio.  In March 2010, murders were down by 
16 percent compared to the same month the year before.
25
 
On an indirect level, state officials ascribe improvements and 
new strategies to Brazil‟s economic growth; its victory in the 
decades-long struggle to control hyperinflation; and the 
success of programs like the conditional cash transfer 
program known as Bolsa Familia—a measure made famous 
by former President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva and 
responsible for lifting more than 20 million people out of 
poverty. In fact, the Lula administration of 2003-2010 saw 
an overall 6 percent decrease in violent crime, which 
politicians correlate with income distribution and growth 
                                                             
24
 “Drug Violence Drops in Rio as New Policing Techniques 
Introduced.” Latin America News Dispatch Online, 20 May 2010, 
http://latindispatch.com/2010/05/20/drug-violence-drops-in-rio-de-
janeiro-as-new-policing-techniques-introduced/ (accessed 2 March 
2011). 
25
http://latindispatch.com/2010/05/20/drug-violence-drops-in-rio-de-
janeiro-as-new-policing-techniques-introduced/.  
15 
 
plans.
26
As a way of justifying the rationale behind according 
Rio prestigious sporting events like the World Cup and the 
Olympics, politicians feel enormous pressure to insist Brazil 
and Rio are on the right track. And in absolute terms, the 
politicians are right: inequality, the deadly driver behind the 
rise of organized crime groups like the CV, is not growing.
27
 
 
Continuity in Brazil‟s economic ascendance rests to some 
degree on improvement and maintenance of security. 
Currently, foreign investors view Brazil favorably, but the 
crime and carnage of Brazil‟s drug wars can still hurt the 
country economically. Organized crime may yet intrude on 
the growth of Brazil‟s burgeoning “virtuous circle, in which 
security brings investment, which in turn brings resources 
that can be used to continue improving security,” says 
Rodrigo Abreu, President of Cisco Brazil. “Everything 
points in the right direction. But a footnote always appears: 
make sure to pay attention to security risks.”28 
 
To this end, Rio is undertaking “pacifications” of favelas on 
a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis, using a special 
counter-insurgency SWAT force, the BOPE, to crush the CV 
and its ilk. In 2010, attempts to drive out the CV from a few 
of the most violent favelas ended with casualties among 
criminals, police and innocent bystanders. While many 
residents appear grateful for the removal of gang activity, 
just as many cite the aggression of the securing officers.
29
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http://latindispatch.com/2010/05/20/drug-violence-drops-in-rio-de-
janeiro-as-new-policing-techniques-introduced/.  
27
, “A Crisis Fluke: Brazil‟s Shrinking Wealth Gap.” Newsweek Online, 
13 August 2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/blogs/wealth-
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Furthermore, given the 2014 World Cup deadline, 19 
“pacified” favelas out of 1000 looks positively Sisyphean. 
As these actions against the CV continue, the nexus between 
crime and the State, and the extent of their corrupt 
relationship, grows starker: a2010 anti-police corruption 
sting known as Operation Guillotine indicted 45 dirty cops, 
including Allan Turnowski, the chief of Rio‟s civil police 
force, for trafficking, bribes and tip-offs to gangsters. Says 
Amorim: 
 
The UPPs, in the form of a community police 
force, are an interesting concept. But it‟s too 
early to evaluate the results. Without a reform 
of the police apparatus, it could all go badly 
wrong. Hundreds of cases of abuse, violence, 
and theft from people who live in the occupied 
favelas exist. In the Complexo do Alemão 
alone [a favela pacified in 2010], 52 law 
enforcement agents were apprehended for 
shaking down the poorest residents. 
Subsequently, the investigation of the federal 
forces, [OperationGuillotine], took down 
officers at the highest levels of Rio‟s police, 
accusing them of selling privileged 
information to criminals. I hope the UPPs 
transform into a political order of security, 
and don‟t become merely “cleaners” of Rio 
for the World Cup and the Olympics.
30
 
 
Much skepticism still remains over the state‟s one-size-fits-
all approach of massive firepower to counter organized 
crime firepower. And has it really decreased numbers among 
members of the CV, especially as they increase focus on 
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domestic drug sales and operations beyond the slums? 
Amorim is dubious: 
 
Actually, it‟s difficult to account for 
estimations of the size of criminal factions, 
especially the CV. In the past few years, 
they‟ve been made somewhat scarcer by the 
rise of UPP forces, which occupy 19 of the 
more than 1000 favelas of greater Rio, and 
the militias, paramilitary groups connected to 
the police and who are present in more than 
100 favela communities. Apart from this, 
however, the state security ministries claim 
that the CV still controls the majority of drug 
trafficking in Rio and even controls 
trafficking connections to other states 
(especially São Paulo, which is associated 
with the PCC) and to other countries. When 
the police and armed forces invaded the 
Morro do Alemão [a favela pacified in 2010], 
the newspaper Folha de São Paulo published 
a Federal Police (the FBI of Brazil) memo 
noting that the CV controls the importation 
and distribution of 90 metric tons of cocaine 
and 400 metric tons of marijuana each year—
a business worth 800 million reais (over 
USD$500 million). In my first book in 1993, I 
estimated the CV to be composed of around 
30,000 members, both within the prisons and 
in the 630 favelas that the organization 
occupied at that time. Today it is impossible 
to determine the real number of members 
now.
31
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So Rio‟s security strategy appears insufficient as the singular 
requirement for eradicating the likes of the CV. To provide 
poor citizens with few options an alternative to organized 
crime, a balance must be struck by combining a reformed 
security approach; income inequality reduction measures; the 
vital necessities of education, public health and housing 
reform; with sustainable employment opportunities. The 
CV‟s lure remains powerful in Rio, despite changes in drug 
consumption and trafficking trends.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Despite economic ascendance, Brazil remains essentially two 
states in one: a prosperous Belgium-scaled State alongside a 
destitute, India-sized nation.
32
 Organized crime and the 
Comando Vermelho have found an optimal growth medium 
in Brazil‟s version of “the first and the developing worlds 
existing side by side,” as author Misha Glenny writes. “The 
first world provides good roads…airports…and an efficient 
banking system…The developing world accounts for the low 
tax revenue, overstretched social services, high levels of 
corruption throughout the administration, and…land and sea 
borders that have more holes than a second-hand 
dartboard.”33 
 
Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply 
embedded organization like the CV, despite statistical data 
pointing to decreases in violence. In fact, Brazil‟s success 
may yet further retrench the CV‟s activities for the reasons 
identified in the preceding paragraph.  In addition, as 
Brazil‟s middle and upper-middle classes expand and 
increase their participation and consumption within the 
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transnational drug trade propelled by the CV, the more 
difficult it becomes to unravel. Culpability for organized 
crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also 
be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can 
be found educated and elite members of society as well as 
the impoverished and desperate. 
 
Brazil‟s systemic social and political failures pose the 
biggest challenge to eliminating organized crime. Politicians 
are trying to build a slick new state edifice on the rotting 
foundation timbers of corruption and historic neglect of the 
poor‟s interests. Until government coordinates a top-down 
response addressing the schism between rich and poor and 
targeting reform across public health and housing, education 
and above all, law enforcement, Brazil will remain a two-
track democracy. Rio‟s wealthy will still be able to revel in 
the city‟s beauty, albeit from behind armored cars and 
fortified mansions, while the city‟s poor will yield—either as 
victims or perpetrators—to the desperate measures of 
organized crime.  
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